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Abstract 
 In order to determine the extent to which intellectual property 
rights should enjoy protection under the constitutional property 
clause, some of the classical and newer justificatory theories for 
property may be employed, including the labour theory, reward 
theory, incentive theory, theory of natural law, spiritual theories, 
personality theory, economic theory, and theory of natural 
monopoly. These theories must be applied in line with the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, keeping in 
mind that other fundamental rights must be balanced with the 
protection afforded to intellectual property in order to ensure its 
continued production. It is also important that intellectual 
property statutes be developed to promote a thriving intellectual 
commons. 
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1 Introduction 
An important question that forms part of an analysis of constitutional 
property protection for intellectual property rights1 is whether (or rather 
when) protection for these interests may be justified. This necessitates an 
analysis and discussion of the reasons why intellectual property rights2 and 
unconventional intangible property interests3 should be protected. The 
classical property theories and some newer theories appear to justify 
protection of intellectual property rights, but for some of the unconventional 
forms of intangible property interests, other theories could be more relevant 
for their justification. For example, traditional knowledge protection may be 
better justified by theories of distributive justice. 
Intellectual property rights are relations between individuals, as is the case 
with other property rights. However, intellectual property law pertains to 
rights in abstract objects. It is necessary to ask whether the legal recognition 
and protection of intellectual property may be explained and justified by 
utilising general property theories or whether a distinctive theory of 
intellectual property needs to be developed.4 Intellectual property should be 
approached in terms of property rights instead of treating it in terms of the 
language of privileges5 and in South African law this appears to be the case: 
intellectual property statutes provide property rule-type protection to 
intellectual creations and private law respects this position. With the 
increasingly important function of intellectual property ownership, the legal 
                                            
  Mikhalien du Bois. LLB LLD (Stellenbosch University). Associate Professor: 
Department of Mercantile Law, Unisa, South Africa. E-mail: dboism@unisa.ac.za. 
This article was presented at the Association for Law, Property, and Society's 6th 
Annual Meeting in May 2015 at the University of Georgia Law School, Athens, USA. 
Special thanks to the late Prof AJ van der Walt for enabling my understanding of 
property law theories. Thank you to Prof CJ Visser for comments on this article. The 
Unisa School of Law Research and Innovation Fund made this visit to the University 
of Georgia Law School possible ﬁnancially. 
1  See Du Bois 2012 SA Merc LJ 177-193; Van der Walt and Shay 2014 PELJ 52-85. 
2  These rights include but are not limited to patents, copyright, designs and 
trademarks. They are protected in terms of property rules under the Patents Act 57 
of 1978, Copyright Act 98 of 1978, Designs Act 195 of 1993, and Trade Marks Act 
194 of 1993, respectively. 
3  These interests may include commercial information, confidential information, trade 
secrets, digital copyright, biotechnological products, traditional knowledge, 
commercial property, participatory claims and non-proprietary rights. 
4  Drahos Philosophy of Intellectual Property 1; Hughes 1988 Geo LJ 288: In 
determining whether the law of intellectual property reflects general theories of 
property, one should keep in mind what the theory of intellectual property should be, 
and determine from that what the law should be. 
5  Drahos Philosophy of Intellectual Property 2. 
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rules are becoming strained.6 The institutions of intellectual property need 
to be scrutinised carefully7 and particularly in South African law needs to 
conform to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the 
Constitution). However, the focus should fall on identifying which aspects of 
existing intellectual property law are supported (in varying degrees) by the 
existing theories, and which have shortcomings when viewed through the 
theories.8  
The nonexclusive character of intellectual property objects and the 
restriction of the free flow of information pose challenges to the justification 
of intellectual property rights.9 
These objects are nonexclusive: they can be at many places at once and are 
not consumed by their use. The marginal cost of providing an intellectual 
object to an additional user is zero, and though there are communications 
costs, modern technologies can easily make an intellectual property object 
unlimitedly available at very low cost.10 
The nonexclusive character of intellectual property characterises it as a 
physically non-excludable resource.11 It may still become legally excludable 
if the requirements in applicable legislation are met by the creator. Where 
such protection is not utilised, the intellectual creation would also become 
legally non-excludable with no subsequent available property protection. 
Sharing intellectual property objects does not prevent or impair the personal 
use of their creator, but prevents the creator from exclusive financial 
benefit.12 The purpose of a justification of intellectual property is to explain 
why one person should have "the exclusive right to possess and use 
something which all people could possess and use concurrently".13 
Exclusive use is not required for personal use in the context of intellectual 
property as it is with tangible property. This must be kept in mind while 
discussing the justifications for intellectual property. The fundamental value 
that society places on freedom of expression and thought must also be 
considered while justifying intellectual property rights, since private property 
improves one person's freedom to the detriment of all other persons' 
                                            
6  Hettinger 1989 Phil & Pub Aff 31-32. 
7  See Hettinger 1989 Phil & Pub Aff 32; Drahos Philosophy of Intellectual Property 1. 
8  Hughes 1988 Geo LJ 289. 
9  Hettinger 1989 Phil & Pub Aff 34-35. 
10  Hettinger 1989 Phil & Pub Aff 34. 
11  See Gray 1991 Cambridge LJ 268-276 where he coins the term "excludable" and 
suggests that this feature is what determines whether a particular interest may be 
called "property". 
12  Hettinger 1989 Phil & Pub Aff 34-35. 
13  Hettinger 1989 Phil & Pub Aff 35. 
M DU BOIS  PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  4 
freedom. Further, restrictions on the free flow of information through the 
granting of intellectual property rights may impede the general advancement 
of new technologies and knowledge.14 
At this point one must remember the difference between property protection 
in private law (through intellectual property statutes and the common law) 
and property protection in constitutional law (through the constitutional 
property clause),15 and also the different purposes served by private law 
protection and constitutional law protection. The purpose of property 
protection in private law is to get strong property rule-type protection for 
private rights against competing private parties.16 Constitutional property 
protection provides bill of rights-type protection for private interests against 
the state and competing constitutional rights of other private parties. 
The South African constitutional property clause not only protects property, 
but provides for expropriation and deprivation by the state, although there 
are strict requirements that need to be met for such actions to be 
constitutionally justifiable. This is important where intellectual property rights 
conflict with other rights such as those to the public domain, human dignity, 
education, or freedom of expression, and they need to be weighed up during 
constitutional interpretation.17 This article does not present a unified 
constitutional property theory for intellectual property rights. However, it 
does highlight and explain the justificatory theories for property that may be 
applied to intellectual property, while taking cognisance of the limitations of 
the theories in view of the purpose of the Constitution,  and particularly 
section 25 (the property clause). In line with André van der Walt's descriptive 
and normative thesis that the legal protection of property rights does and 
should play a 'modest systemic role in the law',18 intellectual property rights 
have taken a back-seat in constitutional jurisprudence where intellectual 
property rights had to be interpreted in line with non-property constitutional 
rights. For example, in Laugh It Off v South African Breweries19 there had 
been a trade mark right that was clearly protectable in terms of trade mark 
law, but despite this, the right was trumped by the constitutional right to 
freedom of expression. The justificatory theories for intellectual property 
                                            
14  Hettinger 1989 Phil & Pub Aff 35-36; Van der Walt and Du Bois 2013 Stell LR 31-54. 
15  Section 25 of the Constitution. 
16  See Calabresi and Melamed 1972 Harv L Rev 1089-1128. 
17  See Du Bois 2012 SA Merc LJ 177-193. 
18  Van der Walt 2014 J L Prop & Soc'y 26-27. 
19  Laugh it Off Promotions CC v South African Breweries International (Finance) BV t/a 
Sabmark International (Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae) 2006 1 
SA 144 (CC). For a discussion of the implications of this case, see Du Bois 2012 SA 
Merc LJ 188-191. 
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protection could play a role in assessing the relative value of a particular 
intellectual property right as compared to the relative value of the competing 
non-property right, in order to find a constitutionally acceptable level of 
protection for each right. 
South African scholarship has largely neglected the justificatory theories 
underpinning intellectual property law. The definitive South African 
intellectual property books dedicate no more than a page or two to the 
subject.20 This may be attributed to the fact the neither legislation nor 
jurisprudence explicitly refers to the reasons why intellectual property 
should receive legal protection. Even the Draft Intellectual Property Policy 
of the Republic of South Africa (Phase 1) 2017 does not explicitly state the 
underpinnings of the protection of intellectual property, although 
commendably it does strive to "[advance] a balanced and coordinated 
approach to [intellectual property] that regulates [intellectual property rights] 
in line with the South African Constitution". It also alludes to "the proverbial 
bargain that the patent holder is supposed to strike with society, namely, 
disclosure in return for monopoly protection...". In other words it implicitly 
relies on the incentive theory, at least for the category of patents. 
There are arguments that the fixed term of intellectual property rights (with 
the possible exclusion of trademark rights which are perpetual in principle) 
makes them fit even better under the justificatory property theories than 
other forms of property.21 As justificatory theories for intellectual property, 
                                            
20  Pistorius "Introduction" 144-145 briefly mentions some broad justifications for 
copyright protection (the natural-justice, economic, cultural and social arguments) 
and also mentions Biotech Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Beecham Group Plc 2002 3 All 
SA 652 (SCA) 659, a copyright case that alluded to a philosophical underpinning. 
Van der Merwe "Introduction" 267 mentions the quid pro quo for the granting of 
monopoly rights via a patent, namely full disclosure of the invention (which 
corresponds with the incentive theory). Ramsden Guide to Intellectual Property 1-2 
mentions immaterial property rights but does not discuss any theoretical 
underpinnings for the protection of intellectual property law; Blignaut "Copyright" 
mentions the incentive theory underpinning copyright. Grant "Patents" 239 mentions 
the quid pro quo involved with patents. Burrell South African Patent and Design Law 
1.1 dedicates a few paragraphs to explaining the quid pro quo in the context of patent 
law, and at 9.1 explains the quid pro quo in the context of designs. Webster and 
Page South African Law of Trade Marks make no mention of any justifications for 
protecting trade marks, and nor do any of the other South African intellectual property 
law books. Dean Handbook of South African Copyright Law 1.1 refers to the "own 
effort" requirement for copyright subsistence, which may allude to the labour theory, 
and at 1.2 mentions the reward and incentive theories as the underpinning for 
copyright protection as well as for patents and designs. 
21  Hughes 1988 Geo LJ 296. On the submission of Proudhon What is Property? 11-12 
that "all Property is theft" Hughes 1988 Geo LJ 289-290 suggests that this slogan is 
incoherent on a literal reading since "the idea of theft presupposes that someone 
else holds legitimate title and that all property must either be justified on labour and 
M DU BOIS  PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  6 
both the labour22 and personality theory have received much criticism. The 
personality theory as derived from the works of Kant and Hegel postulates 
that "an author's personality, spirit and will cannot be free unless the author 
owns his/her work".23 Radin's24 development of the personality theory is 
also important. This article discusses these theories and their criticisms, as 
well as other alternative and supplementary theories. 
One version of the economic theory states that since intellectual property is 
made scarce through artificial constraints imposed by a legal framework and 
restricts public access to the intellectual work, a justification for intellectual 
property rights should be founded on the creation and protection of investor 
value.25 Another fairly recent theory is the theory of natural monopoly,26 
which applies criticisms from natural monopoly theory to the intellectual 
property system. The intellectual commons is a final consideration in a 
discussion of the justifications for intellectual property, but it is not the focus 
of this article.27 The purpose of this article is to discuss each theory that may 
justify the legal recognition and protection of intellectual property rights as 
well as their criticisms. Some preliminary suggestions are also supplied as 
to the particular suitability of applying each theory to intellectual property 
rights. 
                                            
/ or personality theories or would constitute theft". Ciro 2005 JILT 2 would add the 
economic theory to this list, but maintains that the justifications used for tangible 
property cannot apply to intellectual property due to their lack of scarcity (their use 
is non-exclusive). Mostert 1987 SALJ 480 views the labour theory as one of the most 
important in support of the recognition of intellectual property rights. 
22  For example, Ciro 2005 JILT 2 argues that there is no natural right to intellectual 
property in the sense that John Locke argued for a labourer's natural property right 
to an item that is created with her labour. See also Van der Walt 2014 J L Prop & 
Soc'y 34-35, where he highlights the relational rights theory criticism against a 
natural rights based justification for property that "it effectively removes contested 
questions about the distribution of property and of power from the realm of normative 
debate and political contestation". 
23  Ciro 2005 JILT 2. 
24  Radin 1982 Stan L Rev 957-1015. See Van der Walt 2014 J L Prop & Soc'y 38-39 
where he notes that for the personhood theory, property only safeguards 
personhood regarding minimum access to property, such as access to medical care 
or education. Applied to intellectual property rights, this would imply that existing 
patent rights could be limited in the interest of medical care, or existing copyrights in 
the interest of education. 
25  Ciro 2005 JILT 2. 
26  This theory is expounded by Ghosh 2008 U Ill L Rev 1128. 
27  For an introduction to the issues surrounding the intellectual commons see Van der 
Walt and Du Bois 2013 Stell LR 31-54. 
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2 The theory of natural law and labour theory 
2.1  Introduction 
The theory of natural law is derived from the principle that one owns that 
which one creates by one's own (intellectual) effort and labour.28 At least for 
South African law, Roman law may be a starting point in the development 
of a natural-law theory for the recognition of intellectual property. 
The first emergence of a natural-law justificatory theory for intellectual 
property may be seen in Roman jurists' treatment of specificatio,29 scriptura, 
pictura and occupatio.30 In these cases one owner loses ownership of a 
thing due to another person's "occupation" of that thing.31 Own work and 
value is added in such a way that the original item loses its independence 
and ceases to exist as a thing.32 Roman jurists acknowledged that the 
labour of one person could increase the value of the resultant thing to the 
point where the added value was higher than the original, and this entitled 
him to ownership of the new product.33 
A first step towards recognising intellectual property on natural-law 
principles is evident in the rules of pictura, where the painter, and not the 
owner of a tablet upon which such painting was done, became the owner of 
the finished work.34 
From the seventeenth century onwards, Roman-Dutch law authors 
emphasised the importance of writing and the intellectual labour spent to 
create the work. The natural-law principle determined ownership for 
specificatio, scriptura, pictura and occupatio. In conjunction with eighteenth 
                                            
28  Mostert 1987 SALJ 480. 
29  Specificatio takes place when one person's property is converted by another person 
who is not the owner of the original thing. See Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert 
Silberberg and Schoeman's The Law of Property 156. 
30  Occupatio entailed taking occupation of property belonging to no one (res nullius) in 
order to acquire ownership. This pertains to a corporeal movable or immovable thing 
in the sphere of private law (res in commercio) which is not owned by anyone. This 
has to be done with the intention of becoming owner of the thing. See Badenhorst, 
Pienaar and Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman's The Law of Property 137. 
31  Mostert 1987 SALJ 481-485. 
32  See Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman's The Law of 
Property 141-156. 
33  Mostert 1987 SALJ 481-483. See Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert Silberberg and 
Schoeman's The Law of Property 156-159 and sources cited there. 
34  Mostert 1987 SALJ 484-485. 
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century philosophical influences, this express recognition of the natural-law 
principle founded modern recognition of intellectual property.35 
2.2  Locke's labour theory 
Seventeenth century and later legal scholars accorded the natural-law 
principles a larger role in recognising intellectual property. John Locke36 
justified property on the basis that every person has a property in his own 
person, own labour, and works created through own labour. By "mixing" 
one's labour with land or other tangible property, a "natural right" to the 
property is acquired.37 This principle of acquiring property over one's own 
intellectual creations played an important role in the recognition of 
intellectual property rights, especially patents and copyright.38 However, 
whether the labour theory can be successfully applied to intellectual 
property is an open question. 
According to Hettinger39 "[p]erhaps the most powerful institution supporting 
property rights is that people are entitled to the fruits of their labor". The 
labour theory postulates that the products of a person's own intelligence, 
effort and perseverance should belong to that person and to no one else. 
The object would not exist but for that person creating it.40 
2.3  The revised labour theory 
According to Munzer,41 desert based on labour should not be the only 
justification for private property rights, even though it is important. An initial 
and revised theory based on labour and desert may be identified. In this 
context, labour means "the exertion of effort in order to make or physically 
appropriate something" and desert "worthiness of some recompense 
                                            
35  Mostert 1987 SALJ 492-493. 
36  Locke Second Treatise of Government ch V para 27. 
37  See Ciro 2005 JILT 3. 
38  Mostert 1987 SALJ 494-496. 
39  Hettinger 1989 Phil & Pub Aff 36. 
40  Hettinger 1989 Phil & Pub Aff 37: A problem with this formulation is that where labour 
is mixed with something, it may not necessarily be gained, for example mixing one's 
tomato juice with the ocean does not gain the ocean (Nozick Anarchy, State, and 
Utopia 17). See also Petersen 2008 LT 257-280 where he endorses Locke's labour 
theory to justify literary works; Wilson 1994 UCL Juris Rev 233-234 on the application 
of the labour theory to DNA patents; Maniatis 2002 IPQ 136-153 on the application 
of the labour theory to trademarks. 
41  Munzer Theory of Property 254-291. 
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because of some personal feature or action".42 Munzer43 outlines the labour-
desert theory: 
If the background conditions44 exist, then the laborer may use his body to gain 
control over something. If, further, there exist the features of the laboring 
situation45 and the physical and psychological effects described,46 then the 
laborer is responsible for a product that he does not misuse and over which 
his enduring control has no adverse impact on others. If, finally, the evaluative 
and normative features are as specified,47 then recognizing his enduring 
control is the most fitting benefit for his labor and does not infringe the rights 
of others. Such recognition is the acknowledgement of property rights. 
The initial labour theory claims that the labourer would deserve "moral 
property rights in the product in virtue of his labor".48 
Munzer49 suggests the revised labour theory to make the assumptions of 
the initial labour theory more realistic. First, the labourer's property rights 
need to be qualified by broader duties arising from the rights of non-
labourers (for example the right to the necessities of life). The assumption 
of no waste is also unrealistic and necessitates a power of transfer.50 
Examples of such rights of non-labourers are the right to freedom of speech, 
education or other political and socio-economic rights. 
The assumption that property is justified when there are similar things in 
sufficient quantity and quality left for other people and that they lose nothing 
by the labourer's acquisition (the enough and as good as left presupposition) 
could be made more realistic by relying on the principles of utility and 
                                            
42  Munzer Theory of Property 256-257. 
43  Munzer Theory of Property 259. 
44  Munzer Theory of Property 258: The background conditions assume that there is no 
society or government, the thing that the labourer hopes to acquire is not owned, 
there is a sufficient amount of these things with sufficient quality, and the labourer 
has the liberty to use his body for the work required. 
45  Munzer Theory of Property 258: These features are that the labourer has no moral 
duty to work, the purpose of working is to acquire enduring control over a thing, the 
labourer works alone and not for someone, the work done involves physical contact 
with the thing, the work does not reflect how the labourer sees himself in relation to 
others, and all workers work equally intense and effective. 
46  Munzer Theory of Property 258: The physical and psychological effects refer to the 
fact that the labourer produces a product and not a service, the product is not wasted, 
and others are not adversely affected by the creation or gathering of the product. 
47  Munzer Theory of Property 258: These features are that the product is good in a 
general sense, that no one besides the labourer benefits from the product, property 
rights would not be transferable and would be exclusive, the rights would last 
indefinitely, the rights would be the most appropriate benefit for the labourer's work, 
and they would not infringe any other persons' rights. 
48  Munzer Theory of Property 259. 
49  Munzer Theory of Property 266-291. 
50  Munzer Theory of Property 267-269. 
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efficiency; and justice and equality to constrain the acquisition process. So 
outside limits on acquisition through an understanding of social complexities 
are also necessary.51 The scarcity problem makes it impossible for 
acquisition not to change the position of other persons, so exclusive rights 
with no expiry date are not supported by the revised labour theory, but rather 
restricted property rights.52 Most intellectual property rights are exclusive 
(bar the few exceptions provided for in applicable legislation), but for a 
limited duration. Although trademark rights are perpetual in principle (they 
may be renewed subject to continued use), they very distinctly subscribe to 
the use-it-or-lose-it principle. Like other property rights, intellectual property 
rights are not absolute and may be limited by socio-economic rights and 
other fundamental rights where such rights are more pressing in a given 
situation. Intellectual products are not scarce like land, in the sense that 
more can be created. 
Intellectual property is about creation and does not "use up" resources in 
the way that the creation of physical property does. However, information 
resources are taken from the intellectual commons in order to create 
intellectual products. Once taken from the intellectual commons and 
propertised, these resources are no longer available for other persons to 
use in future intellectual creations. The revised labour-desert theory holds 
that labour may still serve as a prima facie justification for property rights, 
but embodied as rights qualified by external restrictions. In terms of South 
African law, some of these external restrictions would entail expropriation 
and deprivation of property rights based on the need to promote other 
human rights. 
2.4  Possible application of the labour theory to intellectual property 
There are many interpretations of Locke's philosophies about property, but 
labour has a relatively small role in the so-called "labour theories of 
property". Drahos53 views Locke's writings on property as valuable for 
justifying intellectual property rights because it shows that such a natural-
rights justification relies heavily on a concept of community and its 
metaphysical scheme. 
Locke's philosophy attempts to address the issue that the earth belonged to 
"Mankind in common", with individual property posing a problem. Natural 
law proclaimed the existence of a commons, but also had to explain private 
                                            
51  Munzer Theory of Property 269-274. 
52  Munzer Theory of Property 274-276. 
53  Drahos Philosophy of Intellectual Property 41. 
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ownership.54 Locke's solution55 was that "every Man has a 'Property' in his 
own 'Person'. Where a person mixes his own labour with something which 
had previously been in the commons, the thing becomes his property". 
Locke56 placed two provisos on this justification: that "enough and as good 
[must be] left in the commons for others" and preventing spoilage. The first 
proviso means that as long as another's position is not worsened by one's 
appropriation of a resource, ownership based on labour is permitted.57 
Some argue that patent law does not pass muster under this proviso since 
inventors who independently invent an already patented creation are not 
even allowed to use their own inventions.58 The "enough and as good" 
proviso describes the commons but also references the natural ceiling on 
how much each person can appropriate through labour owing to the limited 
capacities of humans.59 
The second proviso mandates preventing spoilage: one must not take more 
than one is able to use. It may be argued that intellectual property will never 
be able to meet this proviso entirely due to the nonexclusive nature of 
intellectual property. The relative benefit of products would determine how 
wasteful prohibition of its use by third parties would be.60 
However, the intellectual property rights granted by statutes do not have the 
purpose of granting exclusive use rights, but rather the right to prohibit third 
persons from doing certain exclusive acts with the work. An example may 
be the copyright in a book which does not grant the exclusive right to read 
the book. Anyone who is willing to pay a fee to read a legal copy is allowed 
to read it. Only when third persons wish to copy and distribute the book (in 
other words to do one or more of the acts that fall within the copyright 
owner's sphere of exclusivity), the rights granted by copyright become 
relevant. Copyright grants the holder the mainly negative right of preventing 
third persons from taking away the remuneration to which the copyright 
holder is entitled. In other words, it is not exclusive personal use and 
                                            
54  Drahos Philosophy of Intellectual Property 42. 
55  Locke Second Treatise of Government ch V para 27; Drahos Philosophy of 
Intellectual Property 43; Hughes 1988 Geo LJ 297. Locke's discussion begins with 
the description of "a state of nature in which goods are held in common through a 
grant from God … The individual must convert these goods into private property by 
exerting labor upon them. This labor adds value to the goods, if in no other way than 
by allowing them to be enjoyed by a human being". 
56  Locke Second Treatise of Government ch V para 27. 
57  Hettinger 1989 Phil & Pub Aff 44; Drahos Philosophy of Intellectual Property 42-43. 
58  Hettinger 1989 Phil & Pub Aff 44. 
59  Hughes 1988 Geo LJ 297-298. 
60  Hettinger 1989 Phil & Pub Aff 44-45. 
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enjoyment of the product that is protected by intellectual property rights, but 
rather the rights to exploit the product that are reserved for exclusive use by 
the intellectual property owner. 
These property rights (or at the very least, the statutes provide property rule-
type remedies and private law honours this position) may be justified by the 
labour theory without contravening the two provisos. This analysis is 
applicable to copyright, patents, designs and trademarks. Since the relative 
benefit for third parties from use of trade-mark rights may be viewed as very 
low (it is a purely commercial right - and has no benefit such as educational 
in the case of copyright or medicinal as in the case with some patents) this 
may account for the relatively high excludability of trade-mark rights. 
The question of why labour should serve as the justification for ownership 
and not, for instance, intention or possession61 takes on a utilitarian form in 
Locke's answer:62 just reward for labour is appropriate because it has social 
benefits. Locke63 implies that the common stock of mankind is increased by 
granting property to people who create things through own labour. "Locke's 
overall scheme for property can be viewed as an alloy of the labor and tacit 
consent theories".64 However, as long as the new wealth remains the 
labourer's property, this does not increase the common stock. This must be 
balanced with the risk that free appropriation would discourage the creation 
of new wealth.65 
One solution to this dilemma would rely on donations from the labourer to 
the commons,66 but this would render a well-stocked intellectual commons 
a privilege instead of a right. Locke's solution67 is the introduction of the 
money economy which makes wealth potentially part of the commons. 
Locke assumes three things here: that the individual is able to appropriate 
more than what can be used, that the individual will have the motivation to 
do so, and that (excepting waste) this is not problematic. Locke also 
employs tacit consent to justify his money economy.68 Locke's general 
                                            
61  Drahos Philosophy of Intellectual Property 43-44; Hughes 1988 Geo LJ 298 
disagrees (on the basis that Locke never refers to possession of one's body as the 
basis for property in one's body) with the argument of Epstein 1979 Ga LJ 1227 that 
if possession is good enough to establish ownership in one's self, it should also be 
good enough to possess external things. 
62  Locke Second Treatise of Government ch V para 27. 
63  Locke Second Treatise of Government ch V para 27. 
64  Hughes 1988 Geo LJ 298. 
65  Hughes 1988 Geo LJ 299. 
66  Hughes 1988 Geo LJ 299. 
67  Locke Second Treatise of Government ch V para 27. 
68  See Hughes 1988 Geo LJ 299. 
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system for property may be viewed as a combination of labour and tacit 
consent theories, although the labour theory particularly is considered 
unique to Locke. 
In his justification of intellectual property rights under Locke's labour theory, 
Hughes69 uses three propositions: "first, that the production of ideas 
requires a person's labor; second, that these ideas are appropriated from a 
'common' which is not significantly devalued by the idea's removal; and 
third, that ideas can be propertised without breaching the non-waste 
condition". 
On the statement that idea production requires labour, the "avoidance" view 
of labour, the "value-added" labour theory, and the interaction between 
labour and the idea / expression dichotomy70 are relevant in testing the 
proposition's validity. 
The "avoidance" view advocates rewarding labour with property due to its 
unpleasantness: property should be given to motivate people to perform 
labour. The creation of ideas is not so pleasant an activity that people would 
necessarily choose it above recreation, so this motivation provided by 
property rights is also relevant to intellectual products.71 
The "value-added" labour theory corresponds with the "just desert" 
justification of property: it holds that a labourer deserves a reward for 
producing something holding value to others. The creation of social value 
deserves reward, not the labour in itself. The idea / expression dichotomy 
demonstrates the balancing of the need to reward creators, and free access 
to ideas.72 For example, the Copyright Act 98 of 1978 provides that 
copyright does not subsist in thoughts, ideas or facts.73 
                                            
69  Hughes 1988 Geo LJ 300. 
70  Hughes 1988 Geo LJ 302-314. 
71  Hughes 1988 Geo LJ 302-305. 
72  Hughes 1988 Geo LJ 305-314. 
73  Section 2(2) of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978 provides that a work must be embodied 
in material form; Kalamazoo Division (Pty) Ltd v Gay 1978 2 SA 184 (C); Payen 
Components SA Ltd v Bovic Gaskets CC 1994 2 SA 464 (W); Rapid Phase 
Entertainment CC v South African Broadcasting Corporation 597 JOC (W); Blignaut 
"Copyright" 18-19; Pistorius "Requirements for the Subsistence of Copyright" 164; 
Ramsden Guide to Intellectual Property Law 27. 
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Tully74 and Macpherson75 provide two well-known interpretations of Locke's 
work on property.76 Tully's interpretation views Locke's77 philosophy as a 
justification of the commons and not the right to private property, while on 
Macpherson's interpretation, Locke provides the foundation for the 
justification of private property. 
Drahos78 identifies two factors that may determine how much weight could 
be attributed to labour as a justificatory theory for intellectual property: "a 
conception of community; and the relation of that community to the 
intellectual commons". 
The interpretations of Locke's theory on property may be separated into an 
instrumental and a normative interpretation. An instrumental interpretation 
postulates that society must reward labour with property in order to get 
labour, while a normative interpretation suggests that a reward should be 
provided for labour. Either of these interpretations may be used to justify 
intellectual property, and such application would be free from a number of 
problems that affect tangible property.79 Caution must be taken to place no 
undue emphasis on the labour and mixing metaphor in the context of 
intellectual property, since the mixing of labour allows persons to 
appropriate part of the commons for own use in the context of physical 
property, but where intellectual property is concerned, this very act of labour 
may prevent the emergence of an intellectual commons. 
An example of the influence of natural-law justification for intellectual 
property is visible in the 1769 English case of Millar v Taylor,80 where the 
court decided that literary property in a published work was recognised by 
common law. The recognition and protection of literary property was 
                                            
74  Tully Discourse on Property 174-176. 
75  Macpherson Political Theory of Possessive Individualism 221. 
76  Drahos Philosophy of Intellectual Property 44. Locke's text encourages 
interpretations that are in conflict. 
77  Locke Second Treatise of Government ch V para 27. 
78  Drahos Philosophy of Intellectual Property 44. See Van der Walt and Du Bois 2013 
Stell LR 31-54. 
79  Hughes 1988 Geo LJ 296-297; Drahos Philosophy of Intellectual Property 47-48 
agrees that Locke's theories are widely relied on for the justification of intellectual 
property, but cautions that Locke did have tangible property in mind at the time of 
writing the treatises and too much emphasis is placed on the labour and mixing 
metaphor. 
80  Millar v Taylor (1976) 4 Burr 2303, 98 ER 201. 
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founded on the natural-law principle that a person should reap the rewards 
of his own ingenuity and labour.81 
[Th]e natural law theory, which is justified on the interest of the individual to 
enjoy the fruits of his own labour, is still of particular prominence in the 
protection of modern-day intellectual property and especially new forms of 
intellectual property.82 
A more pressing problem with the labour theory as justification for property 
is that it does not indicate whether a labourer would be entitled to the total 
value of the resulting product or only to the value that his labour has added 
to the resulting product.83 While Locke84 would attribute 99 percent of an 
object's value to human labour, Hettinger85 questions this division. This 
question is also relevant to intellectual property: what part of the value of 
inventions, writings and business information may be attributed to the 
intellectual labourer? While such products would not exist without the 
labour, it does not necessarily follow that the whole value of the creation 
may be attributed to the labourer. 
Intellectual products are "fundamentally social products"86 since creators 
use existing information to create new products. If labour equals natural-
right entitlement to the market value of an intellectual creation, all the 
contributors should share this value. Labour does not entitle the last 
contributor to the full value, so market value provides limited assistance in 
determining the value of a creator's contribution. Market value also depends 
on social factors.87 While a natural right may entitle one to personal use and 
possession of one's creation, it does not justify entitlement to full market 
value. The natural right of a creator to utilise an own creation is distinct from 
the exclusive rights (protected by intellectual property) to make and sell 
copies of the work. "The 'right' to receive what the market will bear is a 
socially created privilege, and not a natural right at all".88 
                                            
81  Mostert 1987 SALJ 496-497. This would mean that an author's right is not artificially 
granted by way of legislation - the legislation is merely supplementary to the natural 
law right of the author. Natural-law theory is not the only theory used in South African 
modern-day law to justify intellectual property, the reward and incentive theories also 
had an influence. See also Rose Authors and Owners in general on the history of 
copyright in the England, which is also applicable to South African copyright law, 
since South African statutes are based on English statutes. 
82  Mostert 1987 SALJ 500. 
83  Hettinger 1989 Phil & Pub Aff 37. 
84  Locke Second Treatise of Government ch V para 40. 
85  Hettinger 1989 Phil & Pub Aff 37. 
86  Hettinger 1989 Phil & Pub Aff 38. 
87  Hettinger 1989 Phil & Pub Aff 36-37. 
88  Hettinger 1989 Phil & Pub Aff 39-40. 
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A theoretical approach viewing the state as an invention, but not individual 
rights - mandating the state to protect but not interfere89 - could lead to the 
undesirable argument that intellectual property rights should be held in 
perpetuity.90 Any statutory introductions such as a fixed term for intellectual 
property rights or compulsory licenses would be viewed as "theft". Such 
statutes are allowed in South African law as long as the state complies with 
the provisions for deprivation and expropriation as set out in the property 
clause. Even on this radical view, one would have to keep in mind that the 
state also has obligations to protect other individual rights (for example life, 
health, and education) and that the protection of the different rights must be 
balanced. The historical tradition of natural property rights does not 
establish the sanctity of property rights; they remain subject to regulation (in 
line with the purposes of natural law).91 Locke's writings cannot serve as a 
basis for justifying unregulatable intellectual property rights, since the labour 
mixing metaphor generates too many uncertainties and problems once it is 
stripped of its metaphysical context.92 It may serve to justify intellectual 
property rights that still require to be balanced with public interest in the 
intellectual commons and other fundamental rights. 
2.5  The intersection between excludability and the labour theory 
Excludability is a notion developed by Gray93 to explain when a particular 
interest may be described as property. The question whether a particular 
interests may be termed property hinges on whether the interest may be 
deemed "excludable". "The notion of excludability … imports a hidden 
structure of rules which critically define the legal phenomenon of private 
property."94 A resource may be deemed non-excludable based on physical, 
legal and moral considerations. A non-excludable resource lies forever 
outside the field of private property, remaining in the commons. 
Physical non-excludability refers to a situation where it is impossible or 
impractical to prevent strangers from accessing the benefits of a resource 
as is.95 Victoria Park Racing v Taylor96 provides such an example where 
purely physical reasons prevented exclusion. 
                                            
89  Nozick Anarchy, State, and Utopia 174-178. 
90  Drahos Philosophy of Intellectual Property 53. 
91  Drahos Philosophy of Intellectual Property 53 - support found in Locke Second 
Treatise of Government ch VIII para 120. 
92  Drahos Philosophy of Intellectual Property 54. 
93  Gray 1991 Cambridge LJ 268-276. 
94  Gray 1991 Cambridge LJ 269. 
95  Gray 1991 Cambridge LJ 269. 
96  Victoria Park Racing v Taylor (1937) 58 CLR 479. 
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Ultimately the risk of non-excludable benefit must rest with the plaintiff, and if 
the plaintiff fails, by such physical means as are at his disposal, to prevent 
unconsented visual intrusion into his land, the particular resource at stake – 
the 'spectacle' – must be deemed non-excludable. No one can claim 'property' 
in a resource in relation to which it is physically unrealistic to control, 
consistently over prolonged periods, the access of strangers.97 
Legal non-excludability refers to situations where the owner of a resource 
fails to use the available legal protection for such resource. Gray explicitly 
mentions the adoption of a particular regime of intellectual property as an 
example.98 Such example in South African law would be the amendment of 
intellectual property statutes99 to include the protection of traditional 
knowledge resources. If the holders of traditional knowledge then make no 
effort to utilise the available legislation, a particular product of traditional 
knowledge would be deemed legally non-excludable. 
Morally non-excludable resources are 
… simply perceived to be so central or intrinsic to constructive human 
coexistence that it would be severely anti-social that these resources should 
be removed from the commons. To propertise resources of such social vitality 
is contra bonos mores: the resources in question are non-excludable because 
it is widely recognised that undesirable or intolerable consequences would 
flow from allowing any one person or group of persons to control access to 
the benefits which they confer. Following such an appropriation, there would 
not, in Locke's well known phrase, be 'enough and as good left in the common 
for others' … It is in the definition of moral non-excludables that the law of 
property most closely approaches the law of human rights.100 
Certain freedoms of speech, belief, association, assembly and movement 
are frequently viewed as values higher than the property concept, and moral 
exclusion recognises the superiority of such claims above "property" claims: 
"Here emerges again the important point that property rights are merely 
prima facie rights which may be abridged or overridden by other moral 
concerns".101 
2.6  Conclusions on the labour theory and intellectual property 
rights 
In determining the extent to which a natural rights or labour theory of 
property may be relied on to justify intellectual property rights, the 
interpretation used is extremely important. The protection of intellectual 
                                            
97  Gray 1991 Cambridge LJ 270. 
98  Gray 1991 Cambridge LJ 273. 
99  Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act 28 of 2013. 
100  Gray 1991 Cambridge LJ 280-281. 
101  Gray 1991 Cambridge LJ 282-283. 
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property rights (patents, works of copyright, registered designs and 
trademarks) may be justified by the labour theory. Every category of 
intellectual creation comes into existence through labour, therefore the 
labour theory remains one of the important justifications for intellectual 
property. The labour theory may have to be interpreted in such a way as to 
incorporate the personality theories. The labour theory does not justify 
unlimited, unregulatable property rights, since the labour theory never 
intended to justify unlimited or unfettered rights. 
Gray's102 analysis of excludability as an indicator of when a particular 
resource receives property protection is important to intellectual property 
(patents, works of copyright, registered designs, trademarks and rights 
protected in terms of unlawful competition) since each category is created 
by legislation or protected in terms of common law. Provided the creator of 
an intellectual work utilises the legal protection, the work will be legally 
excludable and as such enjoy property protection (subject to limitations). 
Some intellectual resources will not be protected as property, but remain in 
the intellectual commons since they are deemed morally non-excludable, 
for example materials that are excluded from patentability.103 
Where a particular resource enjoys no legal protection yet and it may be 
determined that there is no ground for moral non-excludability, an argument 
may still be made for such a resource to receive property protection (via a 
legislative amendment) based on the labour theory. 
Biotechnological products may be justified by the labour theory. Although 
some biotechnological products are legally excludable since they are 
protected under patent law, some forms of biotechnological products are 
not patentable; which may be because they are morally non-excludable 
since the particular information must remain in the commons based on 
fundamental rights such as privacy and bodily integrity.104 
                                            
102  Gray 1991 Cambridge LJ 268-276. 
103  Section 25(1)(a)-(g) of the Patents Act 57 of 1978 excludes the following from 
patentability: discoveries; scientific theories; mathematical methods; literary, 
dramatic and/or artistic works; schemes, rules, methods of performing mental acts, 
playing games or doing business; computer programs; and presentation of 
information. S 25(4)(a) prevents the patenting of inventions that would encourage 
offensive or immoral behaviour. S 25(4)(b) prevents the patenting of varieties of 
plants, animals, or biological methods for their production. Medical methods of 
treatment (s 25(11)); inventions contrary to natural laws (s 36(1)(a)); and nuclear 
energy and material, and inventions contrary to law (s 36(2)) are also largely 
prevented. 
104  For example s 25(4)(b) of the Patents Act 57 of 1978 prevents the patenting of 
varieties of plants, animals, or biological methods for their production. 
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As evidenced by the South African process to include traditional knowledge 
as a form of intellectual property,105 traditional knowledge is a particularly 
troublesome resource. Without specific legislation protecting traditional 
knowledge as the property of the traditional holders, only the last person 
who contributes to an intellectual creation based on traditional knowledge is 
rewarded. When a pharmaceutical company invents a medicine based on 
traditional knowledge of a plant with medicinal properties, only the company 
is awarded a patent. The traditional community holding the knowledge is not 
rewarded. The labour theory, as with most of the general property theories, 
provides inadequate justification for the protection of traditional knowledge. 
Stronger justification could be found in theories of distributive justice or 
human rights. 
3 The reward theory 
3.1  Introduction 
The reward theory advocates rewarding individuals not only for their own 
labour, but for the societal benefit of their effort (creative effort – in the 
context of intellectual property).106 The creator receives an exclusive 
intellectual property right as reward for the creative endeavours. The 
resource is legally excludable because legislation creates the possibility for 
the creators of intellectual products to invoke legal protection for these 
products, provided that the requirements are met as stipulated for each 
category. Legislation mostly provides explicitly for morally non-excludable 
resources. For example, the principle of "no copyright in ideas" is based on 
the concept that the resource must stay in the intellectual commons for 
utilisation by future creators. 
3.2  Possible application of the reward theory to intellectual property 
Society rewards inventors and writers in the form of a legal right to exclude 
other persons from certain forms of use of the work for making the works 
publicly available. Where intellectual property encourages disclosure of 
works that would otherwise remain secret, intellectual property rights 
(particularly patents, works of copyright and registered designs) enhance 
free flow of information. By contrast, trade secret requirements promote 
secrecy and restrict information dissemination. An important requirement is 
                                            
105  Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act 28 of 2013; Harms 2009 THRHR 175-
191 explains some of the difficulties experienced with the process and the 
amendments. 
106  Mostert 1987 SALJ 500; Hughes 1988 Geo LJ 287-366. 
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that the information must not be widely known.107 On this interpretation, the 
reward theory justifies patents, copyright works and designs, but not trade 
secrets. 
The desert theory is another variation on the reward theory: a labourer 
deserves to benefit from his labour. This theory does not indicate what the 
labourer would be entitled to, and a property right is not the only possible 
reward – it could also take the form of "fees, awards, acknowledgement, 
gratitude, praise, security, power, status and publicly financed support".108 
Where a right's value is not proportionate to the effort and labour spent, the 
most fitting reward may not necessarily be a property right. One may not 
necessarily be entitled to the full value produced by the labour, since outside 
factors such as luck may inflate the value.109 According to Rawls,110 even 
one's capability to expend effort is such an outside factor, which makes 
value a morally impermissible criterion in determining distribution. 
Proportionality is an important consideration in determining the appropriate 
reward, since intellectual property rights may earn the owner much more 
value or benefits than the initial expenditure of the intellectual product's 
creation.111 
Munzer's version of the "labour-desert" theory combines the labour and 
desert theories.112 The initial theory underwrites "a prima facie justification 
… for a set of private-property rights in a version of the state of nature" while 
the revised theory supports such justification "for a somewhat different set 
of private-property rights in a modern society".113 While desert still plays a 
role in the revised labour-desert theory, it may be supplemented and even 
trumped by utility and efficiency, and justice and equality, respectively.114 
It is possible to do comparative assessments of desert claims based on 
labour if the relevant features for a worker's performance assessment may 
be identified in order to determine a suitable compensation. Some of these 
features may include "effort, ability, persistence, industriousness, luck, time 
spent, achievement, the difficulty, unpleasantness, or danger of the work, 
and the working conditions" as well as "the responsibility, leadership, or 
                                            
107  Hettinger 1989 Phil & Pub Aff 36. 
108  Hettinger 1989 Phil & Pub Aff 41. 
109  Hettinger 1989 Phil & Pub Aff 42. 
110  Rawls Theory of Justice 104. 
111  Hettinger 1989 Phil & Pub Aff 43. 
112  Munzer Theory of Property 254-291. 
113  Munzer Theory of Property 255. 
114  Munzer Theory of Property 289-291. 
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motivating capacity displayed by one worker in relation to others". Although 
this approach guides in generating relative values for specific kinds of 
labour, it discloses no absolute values, "inherent worth" of labour, or a "just 
price" for labour.115 
3.3 Conclusions on the reward theory and intellectual property 
rights 
Where the dissemination of information is promoted by the grant of 
intellectual property rights, the reward theory seems appropriate. Patent 
rights, copyright and registered design rights seem to meet this requirement. 
Trade-mark rights seem to create no benefit for society except perhaps the 
relatively minor benefit of preventing confusion between the product or 
service covered by a trade mark and other (possibly inferior) products. 
Similar to the labour theory's shortcomings, this theory also gives no 
indication what form the reward should take or even whether it needs be 
property right-based. 
For trade secrets and confidential information, the requirement is that the 
information not be made known - accordingly the reward theory does not 
apply. Digital copyright may also be justified by the reward theory even 
though it is protected by contract in addition to the copyright protection 
afforded. Biotechnological products that are not liable to remain in the public 
domain on conceptual grounds may be protected under patent law and as 
such these rights may be justified by the reward theory. 
Historically, traditional communities received no reward for making their 
traditional knowledge known. A person who registered a patent based on 
traditional knowledge would receive the full reward, not the original holders 
of the knowledge. The application of the reward theory is distinctly limited 
for traditional knowledge rights claimed by indigenous groups. The original 
creators of the knowledge might deserve a reward, but they are no longer 
alive and their remote descendants would not necessarily deserve the same 
reward.116 Accordingly, the reward theory plays at best a limited role in the 
protection of traditional knowledge. 
                                            
115  Munzer Theory of Property 290. 
116  Munzer and Raustiala 2009 Cardozo Arts & Ent LJ 59-60. 
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4 The incentive theory 
4.1  Introduction 
The incentive theory builds on society's interest in intellectual property 
works, holding that legal protection for intellectual works serves as an 
incentive for the production of more intellectual works that will ultimately 
benefit society.117 The incentive theory advocates promoting the creation of 
valuable intellectual works by granting property rights in such works since 
copyright, patent, and trade secret property protection provide the only 
adequate incentives for the creation of a socially optimal output of 
intellectual products.118 
4.2  Application of the incentive theory to intellectual property 
The focus of the incentive-based theory falls on users of intellectual property 
- the grant of property rights to creators is merely a mechanism ensuring 
future production of intellectual creations. The unintended consequence is 
that the very mechanism ensuring the production of intellectual creations 
also restricts availability of current creations.119 It may be better to find an 
equally strong incentive that does not restrict access in this way. 
Government support for intellectual creations and public ownership would 
be one such alternative.120 If intellectual property decreases access to 
products more than it increases production of new products, the goal may 
be better attained by a shorter term for patents and copyright, and 
eliminating the category of trade secrets. Patents and trade secrets could 
be used for monopoly purposes instead of incentive purposes, as intended. 
For these reasons the incentive theory may not justify the institution of 
intellectual property (as is) as well as it may seem.121 
Intellectual property law is intertwined with talk about incentives.122 The 
intellectual property grant is variously viewed as a reward for making a 
                                            
117  Mostert 1987 SALJ 500; Hettinger 1989 Phil & Pub Aff 47: this utilitarian argument 
based on incentives is the strongest and most widely utilised justification for patents, 
copyright and trade secrets. 
118  Hettinger 1989 Phil & Pub Aff 47; the Constitution of the United States of America 
Article I Section 8 Clause 8 (the so-called Intellectual Property Clause) has 
specifically taken up the incentive theory in the context of patents and copyright, 
providing that intellectual property rights are granted "to promote the progress of 
science and the useful arts". 
119  Hettinger 1989 Phil & Pub Aff 48. 
120  Hettinger 1989 Phil & Pub Aff 48-49; Intellectual Property Rights from Publicly 
Financed Research and Development Act 51 of 2008. 
121  Hettinger 1989 Phil & Pub Aff 49-50. 
122  Ghosh 2008 U Ill L Rev 1130. 
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creative work public; a quid pro quo and as such an exclusive right in 
exchange for making new works available; and even natural rights theories 
base the rights on the encouragement of creative activities. The incentive 
theory predicts little about the structure of intellectual property, holding only 
that protection should be as strong as possible to create maximum incentive 
(bar a few exceptions introduced by way of afterthought).123 
The incentive theory is based on the premise that intellectual property 
protection is necessary to correct market failures which arise from the high 
fixed costs of creating and the low marginal cost of distributing the 
creation.124 Using the costs incurred during creation to determine intellectual 
property rights is problematic because it does not determine how intellectual 
property systems should be structured, or policies implemented. Ghosh 
suggests a "re-regulation" of intellectual property that would emphasise the 
role of allocation and utilisation.125 This is useful to South African law, 
especially during a time when the existing statutes are being reviewed and 
updated, and it should be done with other fundamental rights in the Bill of 
Rights in mind. 
4.3 Conclusions on the incentive theory and intellectual property 
rights 
The incentive theory highlights the difficulties in finding a balance between 
an incentive to create and reasonably open access to information. In the 
case of patents, copyright and registered designs, an incentive may be 
necessary to ensure the creation of these intellectual works that may be 
useful to society. However, there are questions whether the intellectual 
property system in its current form fulfils the incentive purpose. Trademarks 
do not seem to be reliant on incentives granted in the form of intellectual 
property rights, since the incentive behind trademark creation is probably to 
distinguish products or services in order to promote business. 
                                            
123  Ghosh 2008 U Ill L Rev 1131; Ghosh 2006 SCRIPT-ed 97-98. See fn 102 on the 
exceptions to patentability. Ss 12-19 of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978 provide for 
exceptions, for example s 12(1) which provides for fair dealing. S 10(1)-(17) of the 
Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993 state the kinds of trademarks that are not registrable, 
for example s 10(12): "a mark which is inherently deceptive or the use of which would 
be likely to deceive or cause confusion, be contrary to law, be contra bonos mores, 
or be likely to give offence to any class of persons". S 14(6) is an example from the 
Designs Act 195 of 1993 excluding spare parts from functional design protection, 
arguably for purposes of protecting free market competition. 
124  Ghosh 2008 U Ill L Rev 1131-1132. 
125  Ghosh 2008 U Ill L Rev 1128. 
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With confidential information and trade secrets, there is no benefit to the 
community because no information is made public. Whether the incentive 
theory is useful to justify a particular intangible property interest or not 
hinges on its usefulness to society, and whether information is being made 
public. 
Biotechnological products are valuable to society, and some form of 
incentive is necessary to ensure their continued production. They would 
only be included if they are not excluded from protection (by reason of moral 
non-excludability) in terms of the exclusions in patent law or in light of public 
interests such as the public domain or a private interest such as the right to 
freedom of expression, privacy or bodily integrity. 
For traditional knowledge the incentive theory has even less application 
than the reward theory, since incentives in the form of intellectual property 
were not necessary for the creation of (existing) traditional knowledge. The 
concern with traditional knowledge is to keep unauthorised persons from 
exploiting the knowledge.126 A suggestion as to how cultural rights of an 
indigenous group may be protected includes 
… a claim right to its TK; a power to create rules that bind others in regard to 
the copying or reverse-engineering of its TK; a claim-right to receive just 
compensation for granting access to its TK; a power to seek and a claim-right 
to have a wide range of remedies for others' failure to pay compensation or 
obtain informed consent; and lastly powers to modify otherwise applicable 
laws of patent and copyright.127 
5 Spiritual theories 
The personality theory as derived from the writings of Kant128 and Hegel,129 
holds that a property right in a creation must be granted before a creator 
can be fully in control of their spirit and personality.130 Hegel's131 writings 
aim to "reveal the role that community plays in the evolution of individual 
freedom".132 On Drahos'133 interpretation of Hegel's writings on property, 
intellectual property may have negative effects on community. 
                                            
126  Munzer and Raustiala 2009 Cardozo Arts & Ent LJ 73. 
127  Munzer and Raustiala 2009 Cardozo Arts & Ent LJ 73. 
128  Kant Critique of Practical Reason. 
129  Hegel Philosophy of Right para 41-71. 
130  See Ciro 2005 JILT 4. See also Maniatis 2002 IPQ 153-166 on the application of the 
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131  Hegel Philosophy of Right para 10. 
132  Drahos Philosophy of Intellectual Property 73. 
133  Drahos Philosophy of Intellectual Property 74. 
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Property rights and personality may be linked in the case of copyright (which 
provides property rule-type protection to literary, artistic and dramatic 
works). The link between personality and ownership of the creative work 
looks strong in these instances.134 Justifying intellectual property rights that 
involve the personality creatively via Hegel's personality theory may be ill-
advised. Contrasting the property theories of Locke and Hegel by reference 
to labour and personality may not be the best approach, since Locke's 
theory135 approaches property as serving the personality, while Hegel's 
theory sees property as the "embodiment of personality".136 Also, Hegel's 
theory views individual property ownership as contradictory.137 
"Private property can be justified as a means to sovereignty", which means 
that to achieve individual autonomy, a person must have dominion over 
certain objects.138 When applying this to copyright and patents, one has to 
distinguish carefully between the creator's right to use his invention or 
copyright work (which is not granted by the intellectual property system) and 
the right to prevent others from using the invention or work of copyright in 
certain ways (as provided by the intellectual property system). While 
preventing a person from using his own invention or work would threaten 
his sovereignty, not having the right to exclude others would not necessarily 
affect this sovereignty. 
A personality justification is often viewed as the most powerful alternative to 
a labour theory for the justification of intellectual property: "[P]roperty 
provides a unique or especially suitable mechanism for self-actualization, 
for personal expression, and for dignity and recognition as an individual 
person".139 
Radin's140 "personhood perspective" holds that in order to be a person, one 
has to have control over certain resources in the external environment, and 
the control must be fulfilled by property rights. Whether an (intellectual) 
property interest may be justified by the personality theory depends on how 
central a particular interest is to the fulfilment of personhood.141 This 
                                            
134  Drahos Philosophy of Intellectual Property 74-75. 
135  Locke Second Treatise of Government ch V. 
136  Hegel Philosophy of Right para 51. 
137  Drahos Philosophy of Intellectual Property 75. 
138  Hettinger 1989 Phil & Pub Aff 45. 
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approach distinguishes between fungible property and personal property, 
with a stronger moral claim for the protection of property which serves 
personhood than for fungible property.142 
Basically, some forms of property are more worthy of protection than others, 
and should enjoy more stringent legal protection. The theory uses a 
continuum, with property closer to the fungible side being more regulatable 
than property on the personal side (which has a stronger entitlement to 
protection).143 Radin's example of personal property takes the form of a 
home because it is closely connected to liberty, privacy and freedom of 
association.144 The area of takings law (comparable to expropriation law in 
South Africa) is an area where this theory can be applied with some 
success. Courts should be more likely to award compensation for the taking 
of personal property than for property that constitutes mere monetary 
loss.145 
Radin's146 personality theory also explores the interaction between fungible 
property and fundamental rights such as freedom of expression, concluding 
that fundamental rights should override any interest in fungible property 
more easily than a personal property interest. It is more difficult to weigh up 
the interests where both have a personal aspect. 
Where a constitutional property case arises, the particular type of property 
in question must be examined to determine whether an element of 
personality is present. If not, another constitutional right such as the right to 
education or freedom of expression would more easily outweigh the 
property interest, particularly if it also entails a fundamental right. If the 
property interest does have a personal aspect, the court would have to do 
more to weigh up the two more equal rights to determine which one must 
ultimately receive more stringent protection. 
It is submitted that intellectual property interests (patents, copyright, designs 
and trademarks) may be justified by the spiritual theories insofar as they 
serve to secure a sphere of personal liberty. Copyright and to a lesser extent 
patent rights are the only categories that appear to be closely linked to the 
personality, as envisioned by Radin's personality theory. Intangible property 
rights underpinned by commercial motives (confidential information, trade 
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M DU BOIS  PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  27 
secrets, rights protected by unfair competition principles and probably also 
trade-mark rights) cannot be justified by the spiritual theories since they are 
not instrumental in achieving individual autonomy. Traditional knowledge 
protection could benefit from personality theory justification, since the 
knowledge is so closely connected to the cultural and spiritual life of the 
holders of the traditional knowledge. The personality theory could serve as 
a point of departure in developing a property theory for traditional 
knowledge, which could form the basis of statutory protection. 
6 Economic theory 
Intellectual property rights are very closely related to markets, since these 
rights create markets in information. Economic theory is important to justify 
intellectual property, but has a very wide scope and diverse approaches. 
For intellectual property, the basic economic theory holds that a market 
failure arises due to high initial creation costs and marginal distribution costs 
of intellectual products, so an economic incentive to create must be 
provided to overcome market failure.147 
A criticism of this theory is that there is no proof that only property rights can 
provide this incentive to create. The creators are often not the owners of the 
property rights, and even if an incentive is provided there is uncertainty as 
to how much compensation would ensure an adequate incentive.148 
Where tangible property is concerned, property laws are essentially used to 
allocate scarce resources among competing needs. The economic 
argument states that without specific property protection, suppliers would 
not produce and supply to the market even with the potential for high profits. 
This argument draws from the free rider principle: opportunists should not 
be allowed to reap where they have not sown, otherwise there would not be 
incentive to invest skill and resources to create.149 The other side of this 
argument is that free riders provide competition, without which there would 
be undesirable monopolies. Arguably, this is the reason why there are 
limited durations imposed on intellectual property monopolies.150 
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Intellectual property is not inherently scarce like tangible property; its 
scarcity is created through legislation granting property rule-type protection. 
The market failure justification is therefore not applicable, since market 
value is based on artificial scarcity created through property legislation and 
not purely market demand. Instead a market instrumental justification is 
used by economists to deem the property system as the only workable 
option.151 
The basic economic theory as applied to intellectual property may be 
explained as follows: 
Information is a public good, non-excludable and non-rival. It is hard to stop 
one unit from satisfying an infinite number of users at zero or close to zero 
marginal cost. Under such conditions, producers of information and 
information goods will have inadequate incentives, leading to under-
production…The solution to this public goods problem is intellectual property. 
By creating a limited monopoly called an intellectual property right, we can 
give producers an adequate incentive to create.152 
Unfortunately, this argument may also be used to expand the reach of 
intellectual property unduly. With digitisation, intellectual goods become 
less rivalrous and less excludable, which arguably requires stronger 
intellectual property protection. However, intellectual property rights also 
create monopolies, which usually impose losses from an economic 
viewpoint. In theory, it might be expected that the benefits reaped through 
encouraging innovation would be offset by the costs of the monopoly. This 
"seems to suggest that the idea of a perfect market in information is 
internally contradictory even in theory".153 
The basic economic theory does not answer the question of how much the 
reward should be or what form it should take. A property right is not 
necessarily the only way to provide compensation or incentive. However, all 
forms of intellectual property are created through financial investment, 
which renders this theory applicable. They have high initial costs, but 
afterwards production and distribution can take place at very low cost. 
Without some form of protection, some intellectual property products may 
not be created, since creators and investors may not be willing to expend 
money and effort. 
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7 Theory of natural monopoly 
As mentioned, intellectual property rights create monopolies. The cost 
structure that governs intellectual property (justifications for the exclusive 
rights granted by reference to the high fixed costs of production and the 
small marginal distribution cost of the subject matter of intellectual property) 
also applies to monopolies and their regulation. Along these lines, Ghosh154 
developed a theory of natural monopoly as an alternative metaphor for 
intellectual property. Applying criticisms of natural monopoly to intellectual 
property challenges the exclusivity of intellectual property, assisting in 
developing intellectual property law in a more public interest-oriented way. 
This entails transforming regulation structures rather than extinguishing 
them. 
Ghosh155 identifies three types of criticisms of natural monopoly that may 
successfully be applied to re-regulate intellectual property: questioning 
assumptions about information and cost; exploring the idea that decreased 
government regulation would be possible if there were potential competition; 
and supposing that the politics and economics of regulation should take into 
account the political reform and recognition of consumer interests. 
In the area of inventing, high fixed costs and low distribution costs are often 
cited to justify intellectual property exclusivity. This justification is similar to 
the one for a natural monopoly: the combination of high fixed costs and low 
distribution costs would drive the market down to zero, therefore artificial 
scarcity through exclusivity is necessary in order to avoid competition that 
would destroy the market.156 
Ghosh's157 application of natural monopoly criticisms to intellectual property 
suggests that in determining how much incentive is required to ensure 
continued creation, a re-regulation is necessary. This approach of viewing 
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intellectual property as part of public law (in other words constitutional 
principles are applicable) acknowledges that the purpose of property is not 
only to strengthen private rights, but also to loosen exclusionary rights. It 
implies that the traditional view of strong property rights must shift towards 
a regime that recognises limits on exclusion. This theory was developed 
with the intellectual property categories of patents, copyright, designs, 
trademarks and trade secrets158 in mind, and suggests how intellectual 
property products may be regulated in order to leave space for other rights 
and interests such as the public domain, the right to education and the right 
to freedom of expression. 
8 Conclusion 
This article asks why and under which circumstances intellectual property 
rights and other intangible property interests should and could be 
recognised and protected under the constitutional property clause. 
The natural-law theory principle that a person should have property in that 
which he has created by his own intellectual effort and exertion has played 
a large role in the recognition of intellectual property rights, but should not 
be the sole justification. While the labour theory is still a strong theory for 
the justification of the protection of intellectual property rights (particularly 
patents, copyright, registered designs and trademarks), it becomes clear 
that it does not justify unlimited rights, but rights subject to private and public 
interests. Intellectual property rights are physically non-excludable, but 
legally excludable where statutes afford protection and such protection is 
invoked by the holder of a particular resource. There are also certain morally 
non-excludable resources that need to stay in the public domain – and 
intellectual property statutes provide some exceptions for these. 
Biotechnological products, particularly DNA-related inventions, may 
sometimes provide an example of a resource that may by morally non-
excludable and as such would not receive any property rule-type protection 
in either private law or constitutional law. 
Traditional knowledge is generally not justified by the labour theory, but 
rather theories of distributive justice or human rights. Applying the labour 
theory leads to the reward of only the last person who laboured on the work, 
usually eliminating the traditional community from any reward. 
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According to the reward theory, an individual should be rewarded for own 
labour and effort, but also for creative efforts that benefit society. Currently 
the creative individual is rewarded by way of an exclusive intellectual 
property right for a limited period of time, but the reward theory does not 
indicate that this would be the only appropriate form that the reward could 
possibly take. This is applicable where intellectual property facilitates the 
disclosure of works that would otherwise have remained secret, and where 
it enhances the free flow of information. 
The incentive theory holds that if creative works are protected by law and 
creators are awarded some form of benefit, then this would motivate other 
creative individuals to create new intellectual works, and this will benefit 
society. A balance must be found between providing an incentive to create 
and the public's access to these creations and inventions. 
The reward and incentive theories are based on the idea that the disclosure 
of useful information should be rewarded by a property right. Where 
information is not disclosed (see for example trade secrets and confidential 
information) these theories are not useful. Patents, copyright and registered 
designs may be justified by the incentive and reward theories, but 
trademarks do not appear to confer any particular benefit on society except 
for prohibiting the confusion of the products or services sold under the 
trademark with other similar products or services, which is possibly not the 
kind of benefit envisioned by the reward theory. Traditional knowledge finds 
no benefit from either the reward or incentive theory. 
The spiritual theories state that an author's personality, spirit and will cannot 
be free unless the author is also the owner of the work created. A person 
must have dominion over certain objects in order to achieve individual 
autonomy. In the context of intellectual property rights, a creator's right to 
use his invention must be distinguished from the right to prevent others from 
using the invention. This theory has been developed into the personality 
theory, which states that a person has to have control over certain resources 
in the external environment in order to be a person and such control needs 
to be fulfilled by property rights. The question whether an intellectual 
property interest may be justified by the personality theory or not depends 
on how central an interest is to the fulfilment of one's personhood. The 
spiritual theories may serve to justify the protection of intellectual property 
only to the extent that they serve to secure a sphere of personal liberty, and 
as far as they do not fall into the category of moral non-excludability. The 
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personality theory as envisioned by Radin159 is perhaps only applicable in 
the context of intellectual creations that are closely related to the 
personality, therefore perhaps only copyright. Traditional knowledge 
protection could possibly benefit from the personality theory since the 
knowledge is sometimes so closely connected to the cultural and spiritual 
life of the holders of the traditional knowledge. It might serve as a point of 
departure in developing a theory specifically for the justification of the 
protection of traditional knowledge. The other intangible property categories 
arguably constitute fungible property. 
The economic theory is most commonly used to justify the protection of 
intellectual property rights (patents, copyright, designs and trademarks), 
since they have high initial costs and low distribution costs and some form 
of protection (through legislation imposing artificial scarcity) is necessary in 
order to ensure continued investment in the creation of intellectual products. 
According to the theory it is necessary to grant a limited monopoly in the 
form of an intellectual property right. However, these monopoly rights may 
also be seen as anti-competitive. 
This necessitates consideration of the theory of natural monopoly as a 
criticism of the intellectual property system. The justification by reference to 
the high fixed costs of production and the small marginal distribution cost of 
the subject matter of patents, copyright and trademarks also justifies the 
protection of natural monopolies and their regulation. Hence the theory of 
natural monopoly can also inform the regulation of intellectual property. 
Understanding intellectual property as a system of regulation brings it under 
public law. This assists in altering the exclusivity of intellectual property 
rights to include other rights and interests, for example the public domain. 
The public domain or intellectual property commons consists of creative 
works that are not protected by intellectual property rights. Some interests 
are incapable of being owned by virtue of their legal nature and others are 
kept in the public domain as a matter of policy. Some may be described as 
morally non-excludable. Certain aspects of intellectual property protected 
works fall in the public domain. These are provided for in the legislation 
governing each category of intellectual property (for example the fair use 
exception in the South African Copyright Act 98 of 1987). The public domain 
entails free use, although this means unrestricted use rather than use 
without payment. In other words, everyone would have access upon the 
payment of some flat fee and the holder of an intellectual property right 
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would not be able to exclude certain persons from the use of a work. The 
public domain is an important interest which should be developed as a right 
rather than a privilege, since it is important to keep raw creative materials 
out of the property regime so that it can be used freely in future creative 
works. 
These theories may be used as a starting point in determining the relative 
value of an intellectual property right where it conflicts with a fundamental 
right such as the right to health, education or freedom of expression. Once 
the relative value has been determined, then the enquiry can proceed to 
balance the two constitutional rights in question or give effect to the property 
right in the space left by the non-property fundamental or constitutional right, 
as may be required in the particular case. 
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